Big Licks

Five Fibre score: 75/100. Assess 15.5/20, Build 15.5/20, Launch 18/20, Grow 7.5/20, Amplify 18.5/20.

Assessment band: Growth Ready.

Big Licks has an operating history and a substantive support offer, but its franchise expansion should be judged separately from the existence of its original stores. The brand combines food and desserts, creating several reasons for a customer to visit. The public training description is also more detailed than a generic promise of support. The assessment gives credit to those foundations while keeping independent franchise ownership, new-site profitability and the recruitment pipeline within the limits of what can be verified.

The strongest financial evidence relates to specific existing stores. The BFA resale material publishes positive 2024 EBITDA for Skypark and Braehead, alongside separate asking prices and franchise fees. Those figures demonstrate reported trading profitability at named locations. They do not establish the return after a buyer funds an acquisition, nor can they be applied to a new site with different rent, footfall and setup costs. An advertised resale is also not evidence that a new independent owner has completed the purchase.

The cost picture needs careful separation. Platinum Wave describes a £20,000 plus VAT franchise fee, neighbourhood-store fit-out from £150,000 plus VAT, and recurring management and marketing percentages. The BFA profile separately states a £275,000 start-up cost. These may reflect format and inclusion differences rather than a direct contradiction. A candidate still needs a complete site-specific schedule that explains which figure covers what, what is financed and how much cash remains available during the period before stable trading.

Assess is strongest on the functioning core offer and weakest on generalising results to future franchise owners. A broad menu can increase the available customer occasions, but it can also increase staffing, preparation and stock complexity. The commercial question is whether the additional sales justify those demands in the proposed format. A neighbourhood store, flagship and kiosk cannot be assumed to share the same production capacity or economics. Each needs its own forecast and a clear explanation of how the concept will be delivered consistently.

Build has a useful practical base through structured initial learning and continuing resources. The next test is whether the training produces an owner and team who can manage peak demand, product consistency and labour without repeated senior intervention. Online access makes learning available, but completion alone is not competence. Opening checks should therefore connect the learning programme with observable service standards, stock routines and commercial controls. That would protect the brand as it moves from familiar stores into businesses managed by new owners.

Launch is clear enough to generate relevant conversations. The recruitment form asks questions that distinguish a single-store applicant from a multi-site developer, and a named external adviser provides a route beyond the founder. The missing public detail is the full discovery sequence, including financial review, format choice, territory fit and existing-store experience. Describing that sequence would help applicants understand the work before investing time in a premises search and would improve the quality of conversations received by the recruitment team.

Grow remains less evidenced than the operational proposition. Historical trade reporting described intentions to open the first franchise stores and an ambitious long-term estate target. The current official location page still identifies the established trading sites and separately says more locations are coming. Neither source justifies converting that ambition into a completed franchise owner count. The useful pipeline should distinguish interest, approved operators, signed agreements, stores in development and stores actually trading, with support capacity considered at every stage.

The next opening should function as an operational proof point. Comparing its staffing, demand and support needs with the original store assumptions would show what transfers successfully and what needs adjustment. That learning should feed back into training and format selection before further agreements multiply the same delivery demands across a wider estate.

Priority one is to reconcile trading locations, ownership and resales so the network's development stage is clear. Priority two is to provide format-specific investment and unit economics, separating store EBITDA from buyer remuneration and financed acquisition costs. Priority three is to turn training into a tested opening handover with clear readiness standards and support cover. Priority four is to publish the discovery stages and track qualified candidates through to successful openings rather than count enquiries alone. Priority five is to connect local promotion and digital ordering with channel contribution, repeat visits, labour efficiency and cash generation. These changes would make the relationship between a proven food offer and a scalable franchise model more visible, while preserving the customer experience that creates demand in the first place.